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'''Timur Kuran''': So preference falsification is the act of misrepresenting our wants under perceived social pressures. And it aims deliberately at disguising oneâs motivations and oneâs dispositions | '''Timur Kuran''': So preference falsification is the act of misrepresenting our wants under perceived social pressures. And it aims deliberately at disguising oneâs motivations and oneâs dispositions. It is very common, and sometimes that occurs in very innocent situations. If I go into somebodyâs home, and they ask me, âWhat do you think of the decor Iâve selected?â I might actually, even though I donât like the decor, doesnât suit my taste, I might say, âOh, itâs wonderful,â and compliment my hostâs taste. I falsified my preference, but not much harm has come out of it. Iâve avoided hurting my hostâs feelings. But preference falsification happens in a very wide array of settings, and in some of these settings, it leads to terrible consequences. In the political arena, people are, whether theyâre on the left or they identify with the right or somewhere in between, people routinely falsify their political preferences for fear that they will be skewered, if they express exactly whatâs on their mind, if they say exactly what they want, if they express the ideas that lie under those preferences. And just to give some examples from our society, immigration is one of these issues. Abortion is another issue. We have a clash of absolutes. Youâre either pro-choice or pro-life, and thereâs nothing in between. And if you take a position in between and offer a more nuanced opinion, that you favor free abortion, let us say, in the first trimester, but not later on, you will be accused by both sides. Thereâs very little that you will gain and thereâs a great deal that you may lose. And in todayâs society, you may lose a lot of friends because the main fault line in American society today is political ideology. There are more people who will object to their son or daughter marrying somebody who holds the wrong ideaâwho supports the wrong party, has the wrong ideology, than will oppose their son or daughter marrying somebody of a different ethnic group or a different religion. So it can lead, what can happen on issues like this is happening on issues like this, is we simply donât come to a resolution. | ||
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'''Eric Weinstein''': Yeah, so before we started this podcast, the time that we were talking together, I sort of made an unfriendly accusation which is that I think that you have developed a brilliant theory but that you have not actually even understood its full importance. And that part of this has to do with the oddity that sometimes to see whatâs so dangerous and whatâs so powerful you actually need a curator. So Iâm hoping to help by curating a little bit of what Iâve gotten out of your theory and how youâve taught me even though weâve never met before this week. One of the things I think thatâs fascinating is that we have a democracy that is stitched together through markets. And when you think about the role of economics | '''Eric Weinstein''': Yeah, so before we started this podcast, in the time that we were talking together, I sort of made an unfriendly accusation which is that I think that you have developed a brilliant theory but that you have not actually even understood its full importance. And that part of this has to do with the oddity that sometimes to see whatâs so dangerous and whatâs so powerful you actually need a curator. So Iâm hoping to help by curating a little bit of what Iâve gotten out of your theory and how youâve taught me even though weâve never met before this week. One of the things I think thatâs fascinating is that we have a democracy that is stitched together through markets. And when you think about the role of economics, the free market, or even a managed market, allows us to each individually direct a larger amount of our action without central direction. And so anything that happens in the economic sphere, like a new theory of preferences, could have absolutely powerful implications because of the role that our understanding of economics plays in underpinning civil society. One of the things that I think is extremely dangerous about your theory, and one of the reasons Iâm attracted to it, is that it is backwards compatible with standard economics. That is, if my private preferences and my public preferences are the same preference, then without loss of generality, as weâre fond of saying in mathematics, everything that youâre bringing to the table is just some unnecessary extra variables because in fact, the two are coincident. However, if my public preferences and my private preferences are different, then while I can recover the old theory from your work, Iâm now in some new territory in which Iâve expanded the field to accommodate new phenomena such as an election whose result no one sees coming. | ||
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'''Timur Kuran''': And weâve broadened the field to accommodate vast inefficiencies that our political system, that involves people expressing their political preferences once every four years through a system that involves primaries, nominating conventions, and so on, and ultimately an election, that this system ultimately produces an outcome that reflects peopleâs preferences. When you introduce preference falsification into the picture, when you accept it as something significant, and I would suggest that its significance is growing, you open up the possibility that our political system can generate outcomes that very few people want, that generate very inefficient outcomes. You open up the possibility that because people are not openly expressing whatâs on their mind, that the system of knowledge development, knowledge production, and knowledge development and therefore solving problems, that gets corrupted. | '''Timur Kuran''': And weâve broadened the field to accommodate vast inefficiencies that our political system, that involves people expressing their political preferences once every four years through a system that involves primaries, nominating conventions, and so on, and ultimately an election, that this system ultimately produces an outcome that reflects peopleâs preferences. When you introduce preference falsification into the picture, when you accept it as something significant, and I would suggest that its significance is growing, you open up the possibility that our political system can generate outcomes that very few people want, that generate very inefficient outcomes. You open up the possibility that because people are not openly expressing whatâs on their mind, that the system of knowledge development, knowledge production, and knowledge development and therefore solving problems, that that gets corrupted. | ||
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'''Eric Weinstein''': Well, | '''Eric Weinstein''': Well, and one of the ways in whichâIâve tried to figure out how to make what you do a little bit more memetic so that more people start to appreciate itâone of the ways Iâve tried to talk about it among friends is that you have developed a theory of the black market in the marketplace of ideas, that is underground concepts, underground desires, unmet fears, that canât be discussed in the curated market, managed by institutions. Another way of saying is that this is the economy of silence, or the economy of deception. Do those fit? | ||
''00:09:55'' | ''00:09:55'' | ||
'''Timur Kuran''': I would prefer economy of deception because people donât stay silent. We donât have, you know, in our society on most issues, people donât have the luxury to stay silent when they are in an environment consisting mostly of pro-choice people or mostly pro-life people, they are asked to take a position. So itâs not that some people are speaking and other people are silent. If that were the case, we would know, well, 70% of society is silent. They must not agree with either of the two extreme positions, pro-life and pro-choice. But people actually pretend when theyâre in a group that is primarily or exclusively pro-choice or pro-life. They sense this. They take that position | '''Timur Kuran''': I would prefer economy of deception because people donât stay silent. We donât have, you know, in our society on most issues, people donât have the luxury to stay silent when they are in an environment consisting mostly of pro-choice people or mostly pro-life people, they are asked to take a position. So itâs not that some people are speaking and other people are silent. If that were the case, we would know, well, 70% of society is silent. They must not agree with either of the two extreme positions, pro-life and pro-choice. But people actually pretend when theyâre in a group that is primarily or exclusively pro-choice or pro-life. They sense this. They take that position. That is preference falsification, and in doing that, they also fail to express or choose not to express the reasons why they find an intermediate position more attractive. | ||
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'''Timur Kuran''': And all of those reasons get subtracted from public discourse. We have a very distorted public discourse on which that is underlying our whole political system. | '''Timur Kuran''': And all of those reasons get subtracted from public discourse. We have a very distorted public discourse on which, that is underlying our whole political system. | ||
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'''Eric Weinstein''': So, I mean, thereâs so much thatâs juicy to dig into. I think that you may be undervaluing some of the aspects of silence where somebody will say, âWell, look, Iâm not a very political person,â somebody else might make an admonition, âKeep your head down,â âstick to your knitting,â â[[Stay In Your Lane|stay in your lane]].â There are all of these ways in which we do favor silence, but those of us who have to speak in a professional capacity, weâre expected to form opinions on these things | '''Eric Weinstein''': So, I mean, thereâs so much thatâs juicy to dig into. I think that you may be undervaluing some of the aspects of silence where somebody will say, âWell, look, Iâm not a very political person,â somebody else might make an admonition, âKeep your head down,â âstick to your knitting,â â[[Stay In Your Lane|stay in your lane]].â There are all of these ways in which we do favor silence, but those of us who have to speak in a professional capacity, weâre expected to form opinions on these things, we really donât have the luxury usually of staying silent. | ||
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'''Timur Kuran''': We take ourselves out of the game, | '''Timur Kuran''': We take ourselves out of the game, and weâre successful in doing that in most contexts, but in going through daily life, we find ourselves in situations, in social events or in the workplace, where we have to take a position. Everybodyâs taking a position, thereâs an issue that, youâre sitting around the table and an issue is being discussed. And it has to do with workplace policy on some issue. And you have to take a position and you have to sometimes vote. So your point is well taken that in any personâs life thereâs a pretty broad zone in which you can avoid taking a position. So yeah. | ||
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'''Eric Weinstein''': | '''Eric Weinstein''': So letâs go back through a little bit of just modern history and talk about the times in which preference falsification, even though people have often not had the terminology for this theory, really came into its own in a way where people were so surprised by a turn of events, that they came to understand that people held preferences that were far different than the preferences that had been assumed to be held and relatively, letâs say, radically quick shifts in that structure. | ||
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'''Timur Kuran''': Or Hungary, the show trials of Stalin, this is the kind of thing, the Gulag. People would talk about, you know, refer to Solzhenitsynâs book. When you actually looked at these societies, some of them in which there was no gulag and the prison population was smaller than the prison population at the time in the United States as a proportion | '''Timur Kuran''': Or Hungary, the show trials of Stalin, this is the kind of thing, the Gulag. People would talk about, you know, refer to Solzhenitsynâs book. When you actually looked at these societies, there were some of them in which there was no gulag and the prison population was smaller than the prison population at the time in the United States as a proportion. Czechoslovakia is a good example. So it wasnât, Czechoslovakia wasnât a place that we associate with show trials. Yes, we think of 1968 when Soviet tanks came rolling in, but even after that you didnât have major trials, you didnât have huge numbers of people disappearing. So what is it that kept Czechoslovakia a communist society, and what kept it a communist society is the people who hated the system pretended to approve of the system and turned against dissidents, the very few dissidents who had the courage to say, âThis is a system that is not going to last forever. Itâs an inefficient system. It hasnât brought us freedom. The state hasnât withered away, itâs gotten bigger, itâs more important in our life,â and they would turn against them. What sustained communism all across the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites was preference falsification. Now what this meant was that the system was extremely unstable. People were falsifying their preferences because other people were doing so. Even though I was against communism, and you were against communism, we both supported the system because the other was. Now this is a system where if one of us decides for whatever reason that weâre going to call a spade a spade and say, âThis system doesnât work, I donât like it,â I go out in the street and I start demonstrating, a lot of other people are going to follow. So what happened is, ultimately, when some demonstrations began, and it happened to be the demonstrations started in East Germany, these demonstrations started growing. Every week, more and more people found in themselves the courage to say what they believed and to come out against the regime. The regime itself didnât want to overreact. There were discussions in the [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politburo Politburo]. Some people said, âWe better crack down right now or this is going to get out of hand.â Other people said, âWell, if we crack down now and some people die, that can, the negative effects could be greater. Winter is coming, pretty soon it will be harder, people will be more reluctant to go out in the street, letâs let this pass, letâs not overreact.â Before they knew it, the Berlin Wall was down and that created a domino effect. Nobody foresaw that. And itâs quite significant that among the people who missed this were the dissidents, the East European dissidents, who were the only people, and I include in this all the top experts, CIA experts, the top academics studying Eastern Europe, almost understood what was holding the system together. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VĂĄclav_Havel VĂĄclav Havel] wrote a book called [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Power_of_the_Powerless The Power of the Powerless], and its main message was, âThis society that hates communism holds within it the power to topple it.â Even he missed this evenâ | ||
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