Editing H-1B Visa (section)

== Economic Mechanisms and Theoretical Foundations ==

From an economic perspective, Weinstein argues that [[Labor Shortages|long-term labor shortages cannot exist in large market economies with functioning wage mechanisms]], as rising demand would naturally increase salaries to attract supply, clearing the market. He likens claimed STEM shortages to mythical "jackalopes"—fictitious constructs used by employers and institutions to justify interventions. The H-1B program, in his view, tampers with this mechanism by importing foreign PhDs as a "lure" for immigration, holding down U.S. PhD salaries. A key quote from the secret NSF study he cites: "A growing influx of foreign PhD's into U.S. labor markets will hold down the level of PhD salaries to the extent that foreign students are attracted to U.S. doctoral programs as a way of immigrating to the U.S."

Technically, this creates a "perverse effect" where provisions to "rectify" shortages ensure their continuation by preventing wage signals from functioning. H-1B visas tether workers to sponsoring employers, introducing elements of "servitude" that distort wage negotiations and render the workforce more "docile and pliable." Weinstein contrasts this with [[Ronald Coase|Ronald Coase's]] theorem on property rights, suggesting labor access rights should be securitized and traded (e.g., as shares in compensation packages) rather than confiscated as "seigniorage" for employers.

Weinstein highlights how the system treats STEM workers as non-unionizable "graduate students" or "trainees" (e.g., postdocs), paid partly with immigration lures, which suppresses overall compensation and ignores externalities like displacement of niche businesses that natives might found. Data he cites includes foreign students accounting for nearly all PhD growth since the mid-1980s, with over 50% of engineering PhDs going to foreigners by 1990, and postdoc numbers tripling for internationals while stagnating for domestics. This leads to pay compression, rising unemployment (e.g., math PhDs from 2% to 11% by 1995), and negative opportunity costs for U.S. students, who forgo wages during 10+ years of training for modest premiums.